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In July 2011, the Defense Business Board (DBB) made recommendations to the 
Secretary of Defense for modernizing the military retirement system. If implemented, the 
plan would significantly modify military retirement as it has existed since its inception, 
shifting it from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan.   
In this study, we compared the current defined benefit retirement plan to a 
hypothetical, retrospective defined contribution plan using the constraints proposed by 
the Defense Business Board Military Compensation Task Group. We also gathered 
service members’ sentiments about the current military retirement system and proposed 
changes. This is an important topic because it revealed the potential financial effects on 
service members’ retirement savings, and government and departmental challenges 
should a new retirement system be implemented.  
In this study, we created a mathematical model to simulate accumulated savings 
under the proposed defined contribution (DC) plan, and then compared it to the lump-
sum equivalent of the existing defined benefit (DB) plan. Our model considered three 
investment strategies for asset allocation for active-duty personnel (i.e., officer and 
enlisted) spanning a 20-year career beginning in January 1, 1991, and ending in 
December 31, 2010. Additionally, our study surveyed active-duty service members 
assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School and personnel assigned to the II Marines 
Expeditionary Force. Through the survey, we gathered feedback on service members’ 
attitudes toward military retirement, in general, and proposed changes to the military 
retirement system.     
For an officer, the model showed that under a DC plan, accumulated savings were 
only 37.5% of the lump-sum equivalent of total annuities received under the current DB 
 vi
plan. Likewise, for an enlisted service member, this value was 31.9%. The survey showed 
that an overwhelming majority of service members are in favor of retaining the current 
DB retirement system, or, if the retirement system must be replaced, doing so gradually.   
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This MBA professional report addresses two key points. First, assuming that the 
recommendations from the July 2011 Defense Business Board (DBB) Military 
Compensation Task Group were implemented 20-years ago (i.e., 1991), how would 
retirement savings change compared between the DBB’s proposed retirement plan and 
the High-3 version of the current retirement plan?  Second, we conducted a survey of 
active-duty service members to ascertain their knowledge of and preferences for the 
current military retirement system and proposed changes to the military retirement 
system. Comparing the two plans allows service members entering the military today to 
compare their cumulative retirement savings under a defined contribution (DC) plan1 
with the defined benefit (DB) plan2 used today. The survey responses can be used by 
military leadership and policy makers to make more informed decisions when it comes to 
determining changes to the military retirement system. We discovered two other surveys 
during our research that solicited feedback on the current retirement system and the DBB 
recommendations. These survey populations differed in that they included former 
members of the military and cadets serving in Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) 
programs. One of the survey questionnaires was not released to the public. The other 
survey questionnaire was used as a baseline to develop demographic, military retirement 
compensation, military retirement proposed changes, and fairness questions for this 
study’s survey.     
Three tasks were performed in order to address this report’s key points. First, a 
model based on the parameters provided within the DBB’s recommendations was created 
to calculate the net present value (NPV) of a service member’s retirement savings after 
                                                 
1 A plan in which it is the responsibility of the employer to contribute a specified amount each year, 
based on a formula established in the plan, to the employee’s retirement account. The plan defines only the 
contributions to the plan, and does not specify how much an employee will ultimately receive (Ortega, 
2007, pp. 458–467). 
2 A plan which specifically defines the benefits to be received by the employee. A formula, which 
takes into consideration an employee’s age, compensation, and length of service, determines the amount of 




20 years of service (YOS). Three investment strategy scenarios were applied to the 
retirement savings of an active-duty officer and an enlisted service member throughout 
their 20-year careers. Second, the final values from the hypothetical scenarios mentioned 
previously were compared with the NPV of retirement savings under the current military 
retirement system (High-3 version) at the 20 YOS mark. Finally, a survey was conducted 
of active-duty officers enrolled at the Naval Postgraduate School and personnel serving 
with the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to solicit their perceptions and opinions 
about the current military retirement plan and the DBB’s recommended changes. 
A. BACKGROUND 
On July 21, 2011, the DBB released its initial findings and recommendations after 
conducting an eight-month study tasked by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The 
SECDEF’s mandate for the task group was “to provide recommendations that will enable 
the system to be fiscally sustainable and recruit and retain the highest personnel required 
for our nation’s defense” (DBB, 2011, p. 11). A summary of the DBB’s 
recommendations is provided in Appendix A. The DBB primarily recommended that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) transition from the current DB plan to a DC plan similar to 
the 401(k) plans offered by civilian employers. To accomplish this, the Thrift Savings 
Plan (TSP) would become the primary source of retirement income, with the DoD 
providing a contribution match “comparable to the highest end of a private sector pension 
plan” (DBB, 2011, p. 31). Under such a system, service members would become vested 
after three to five years. Under the current system, service members do not qualify for 
military retirement unless they serve 20 years, a retirement scenario known as “cliff 
vesting.” 
Should the DBB’s recommendations be adopted, “the new retirement plan would 
mark the biggest change in military retirement in more than 60 years and require approval 
from Congress” (Joyner, 2011). It should not come as a surprise that the DoD is 
considering a shift to a DC plan. According to Ortega, there has been a “noticeable shift” 
by employers from DB plans to DC plans since the 1980s.  “In 1980, 84% of workers at 




percentage had dropped to 33%. Similarly, the number of DB plans offered at companies 
has decreased from 112,200 in 1985 to 29,700 in 2005” (Ortega, 2007). Adopting a DC 
plan is not a new topic of discussion in the halls of the Pentagon; however, with the 2008 
recession and a lumbering recovery, it has reemerged as a potential austerity measure 
within the U.S. government.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
We created a mathematical model of the DBB’s recommendations to simulate the 
accumulated retirement savings using historical data for military basic pay and TSP 
investment fund return rates from 1991–2011; this interval corresponds to the 20 years 
that military personnel must serve in order to qualify for a retirement pension. This 
amount of savings was then compared to the lump-sum equivalent, or NPV, of all 
retirement annuities received from retirement until the average age of death as specified 
by the DoD Office of the Actuary. The DBB recommended several parameters including 
a 3- to 5-year vesting period, pension withdrawal age ranging from 60 to 65, and a 
variable percentage match based on the higher end of a private sector plan, which could 
be adjusted in certain scenarios such as combat and/or arduous duties. Our model 
assumes a fixed contribution match with no consideration for vesting period or pension 
withdrawal age. Historical TSP investment fund return rates were the basis for 
determining the annual returns for the service member in the DBB scenario. Portfolios 
were diversified, favoring a higher stock asset allocation versus bond allocations, and 
included considerations for a higher risk tolerance. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Our research provides service members a comparison between the accumulated 
retirement savings under a DBB proposed DC retirement system, and the single lump-
sum equivalent value of the retirement pay under the current (High-3 version) of the DB 
plan. This research also provides survey findings regarding service members’ knowledge, 




This is not a manpower study. Our findings do not include effects on retention, 
policy, or taxation issues. This is not a portfolio optimization study. As mentioned 
previously, investment best practices are utilized to determine portfolio diversification 
throughout the service member’s career. Our study only considered non-disability 
retirement. Other benefits such as health care, G.I. Bill, exchange/PX and commissary 
privileges, and so forth, are not considered in the study. 
The subjects of the study included active-duty officers and enlisted personnel only; 
service branch and gender were not taken into consideration. Historical data were used 
for pay tables, TSP fund return rates, and life expectancy rates. NPV at 20 YOS was the 
value compared for each plan. For the DBB plan, NPV is the accumulation of retirement 
savings over 20 YOS. Retirement savings were calculated by taking 8% (assumed) of the 
service member’s base pay (with government match; total contribution equals 16%) and 
investing it into two TSP funds (one bond fund, and one stock fund) each month. The 
final value at 20 years is the sum of all contributions compounded over that time period. 
For the High-3 version of the current plan, NPV is defined as the lump-sum equivalent of 
the total pension annuities paid from the time of retirement to death (DoD Office of the 
Actuary life expectancy rate used). Social Security is not included in retirement savings 
for either the DBB recommended plan or the High-3 plan. See Figure 1 for a visual 
representation of the plan comparison.   
 




The military did not begin participating in the TSP until 2001. Although this is the 
case, the TSP has been in existence since 1986 when it was first offered to civil servants 
participating in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and Federal Employees 
Retirement System (FERS). Because the range of our counterfactual model begins in 











II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides an overview of commissions, task forces, 
legislation, and so forth, which shaped military retirement reform from the 1800s to the 
present day. With an understanding of the historical milestones, reforms, and 
recommendations which contributed to the evolution of the military retirement system, 
we gain insight into contemporary challenges and recommendations. Following the 
review of historical military retirement reforms, overviews of recent studies that promote 
specific changes to the military retirement system and surveys are provided. While the 
recommendations included here are not exhaustive, they represent some of the most 
prominent reforms recommended to date. This section relies heavily upon John 
Christian’s (2006) RAND technical report entitled An Overview of Past Proposals for 
Military Retirement Reform.  
A. HISTORICAL COMMISSIONS AND LEGISLATION SHAPING 
 MILITARY RETIREMENT (1800S TO 1986)  
Early historical records show that the American colonial governments compensated men 
who became disabled from territorial disputes with Native Americans. Similarly, this 
type of financial backing was expanded to include militia members during the 
Revolutionary War and, once the Continental Congress was formally organized, this 
pension system was adopted for its fledgling army and naval forces. These measures 
represented early attempts, on behalf of the general population and the government, to 
provide some sort of pension-type payment for those who served to protect the nation 
(Clark, Craig, & Wilson, 2003). 
In 1855, the Secretary of the Navy authorized, “with the recommendation of an 
examination board, to involuntarily terminate officers who were deemed incapable or 
unfit for duty” (Christian, 2006, p. 2). Six years later, voluntary retirement was 
authorized for service members who attained 40 YOS. Furthermore, in 1870, Army and 
Marine Corps officers became eligible for voluntary retirement after only 30 YOS. 




current vesting requirement of 20 YOS was established in 1946 for Navy and Marine 
Corps officers and likewise established for Army and Air Force officers in 1948 
(Christian, 2006).  
1. Advisory Commission on Service Pay (1948) 
Shortly after adopting the 20 YOS vesting requirements in 1946 and 1948, 
concerns arose regarding the high costs projected to sustain military pensions. The 
Advisory Commission on Service Pay, also known as the Hook Commission, 
recommended that retirement be pushed to 30 YOS from 20 YOS due to the fact that 
service members could retire at around age 42, while still earning 50% of their basic pay 
throughout their lifetime (Christian, 2006). Almost 65 years later, the DBB made similar 
observations, stating, “the DoD pays retirees 40 years of retirement benefits for 20 years 
of service” (DBB, 2011). In 1948, the Joint Army–Navy Pay Board generally agreed with 
the Hook Commission, suggesting that the payment of the retirement annuity should 
begin at age 62, but the recommendations were not instituted and pension benefits 
continued to be collected immediately at retirement (Christian, 2006). 
2. First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (1969) 
In 1969, the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) was tasked 
“to lower the cost of the retirement” (Christian, 2006, p. 4). With this very broad goal, the 
QRMC offered several recommendations which have remained prevalent, in some 
variation, in subsequent recommendations. Their most prominent recommendation was 
the establishment of “life phases,” which were spans of time following a service 
member’s military retirement. For a service member retiring at age 42, the next 20 years 
constituted the first phase, or “second-career phase,” and from age 62 to death constituted 
a second phase, the “old age phase.”  The QRMC recommended that the payouts for each 
phase be different to reflect the reality that most service members would have a second 
career after retiring from the military in their 40s. Depending on YOS at retirement (i.e., 
20 years or beyond), the annuity amount for each phase would vary. In the second-career 




In the old age phase, the annuity ranged from 33% of final salary at 20 YOS to 75% at 40 
YOS (Christian, 2006). 
3. Interagency Committee on Uniformed Services Retirement and 
Survivor Benefits (1971) 
In 1971, a new committee called the Interagency Committee on Uniformed 
Services Retirement and Survivor Benefits (IAC) further refined the recommendations 
originally proposed by the first QRMC. The IAC advocated a more detailed phase 
reduction of the retirement annuity based on the QRMC’s second-career and old-age 
phase approach. Most notably, the IAC recommended using the average of a service 
member’s highest three years of basic pay, as opposed to final basic pay, as a basis for 
determining the retirement annuity amount. As a result of the IAC’s recommendations, 
and in conjunction with the DoD Retirement Study Group, the Uniformed Services 
Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) of 1974, H.R. 12505, was introduced in the House 
of Representatives. The RMA contained three major recommendations: (1) a High-one 
pay base (the average basic pay during the service member’s final year in service) for 
calculating retirement annuity; (2) a flat reduction of 15% for service members in the 
second-career phase of retirement until they would have reached 30 YOS; and (3) an 
offset of military retirement benefits by 50% of Social Security benefits (Christian, 2006). 
The House Armed Services Committee considered the RMA, but it failed to garner the 
required support to reach the House floor (Uniformed Services RMA, 1974).  
4. Defense Manpower Commission (1976) 
The Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) sought once again to institute the 
IAC’s High-3 recommendation in 1976. Additionally, the DMC proposed that the age of 
annuity payouts begin at age 65 instead of immediately at retirement. After attempting to 
model the RMA’s Social Security offset proposal, however, they determined that “there 
was an insoluble attribution problem with the RMA’s proposal; in other words, there was 




service and to civilian employers.”  As a result, the DMC did not support the Social 
Security offset feature of the RMA and opposed its passage (Christian, 2006).  
5. The President’s Commission on Military Compensation and the 
Uniformed Services Retirement Benefits Act (USRBA) of 1979 
In April 1978, the President’s Commission on Military Compensation (PCMC), 
also known as the Zwick Commission, suggested that military compensation be “more 
cost-effective, flexible, and fair” (Christian, 2006, p. 6). From 1964 to 1978, military 
retirement costs rose from 2% to 8% of the Pentagon’s budget, a trend that would 
continue to present day (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Military Retirement Trust Fund Expenditures by Fiscal Year  
(From Defense Business Board, 2011, p. 10) 
Furthermore, the PCMC noted that compensation for service members was closer 
to being on equal footing with civilian compensation, leading them to recommend that 
the military retirement annuity be made comparable to that of civil servants. They also 
renewed the notion of a Social Security offset, originally proposed in the RMA. The 
PCMC’s recommendations were captured in the Uniformed Services Retirement Benefits 




its RMA predecessor. According to the Congressional Budget Office (1984), “the cost 
savings would not have been realized for 20 or more years owing to the grandfathering of 
the entire active-duty force,” which made it politically unattractive; plus, the Services 
were not supportive (p.  36). 
6. National Defense Authorization Act of 1981 
The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1981 brought about the 
demise of final pay as a basis for determining a service member’s retirement annuity 
payment. In its place, the authorization provided the new High-3 method for determining 
the military retirement annuity. The cost savings reasons for instituting this change were 
two-fold: (1) It would reduce the annuity by taking an average of the service member’s 
pay from the highest three YOS (generally the last three years), versus the final base pay, 
to calculate the base pay rate from which the 50% annuity would be determined; and (2) 
it “would mitigate certain windfall benefits” incurred, such as when a service member 
was promoted or accumulated another year of service. This change represented the most 
significant in military retirement since World War II (Christian, 2006).  
7. The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) 
and the National Defense Authorization Act of 1984 
In January 1984, the fifth QRMC proposed several new reforms that had never 
been considered. The first recommendation was to reduce the multiplier rate used to 
determine the percentage at which retirement annuities were paid. At the time, that 
multiplier was 2.5%, so service members with 20 YOS would get 50% of their final 
pay/High-3 (and an additional 2.5% for every year of service thereafter). The fifth 
QRMC advocated a rate of 2.0%. A second proposal by the fifth QRMC was a reduction 
in the cost of living adjustment (COLA; Christian, 2006). 
Portions of the fifth QRMC’s recommendations were included in the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1984; however, the QRMC’s proposal for adjusting the 
multiplier was not included. Their recommendations included a repeal of the “one-year 




annuities on the greater of either the previous year’s pay scale or the one in effect at the 
time of retirement (Christian, 2006). Other changes seemed minor, but led to significant 
cost savings for the DoD. Similar to civil servant retirement annuities, military annuities 
were then required to be rounded down to the next dollar, and fractional YOS were also 
required to be rounded down to the “next lowest whole month” (Christian, 2006).    
8. Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 
On July 31, 1986, Congress passed the Military Retirement Reform Act (MRRA) 
of 1986. Commonly referred to as “Redux,” this legislation used the fifth QRMC’s 
recommendation to adjust the retirement multiplier from 2.5% to 2.0%. Under the new 
design, a service member serving for 20 years would receive 40% (2.0% * 20 YOS) of 
their High-3 basic pay and 3.5% for every year after 20 YOS, up to 30 YOS. COLAs 
were also targeted in the MRRA. During a retiree’s second-career phase, COLAs were to 
be reduced by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus 1%. At age 62, the service member 
would receive a “one time restoration of purchasing power followed by CPI minus 1% 
again” (Christian, 2006). 
In 2000, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Human Resource 
Strategy did not recommend cuts in military compensation due to the unfairness of the 
MRRA. Taking the lead from the DSB, Congress included language in the 2000 Defense 
Authorization Act which granted service members who entered under the Redux policy 
the option of returning back to the pre-Redux retirement system, or remaining in the 
Redux system and receiving a $30,000 Career Status Bonus (CSB) at 15 YOS with a 
commitment to stay in until at least 20 YOS (Christian, 2006).  
B. RECENT PROPOSALS TO MODIFY MILITARY RETIREMENT 
For the purposes of this report, recent proposals include those major 
recommendations made since the 2000 Defense Authorization Act was passed. Because 
the DBB’s recommendations represent the most recent proposals, and are the focus of 




relies heavily upon Charles A. Henning’s (2011) Congressional Research Service report 
entitled Military Retirement Reform: A Review of Proposals and Options for Congress. 
1. Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation (2006) 
In 2005, the SECDEF, Donald H. Rumsfeld, tasked the Defense Advisory 
Committee on Military Compensation (DACMC) to “identify approaches to balance 
military pay and benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of high quality people, 
as well as a cost-effective and ready military force.”  In addition to military retirement, 
the six-member committee, chaired by Admiral D. L. Pilling, U.S. Navy (Ret.), 
considered several other compensation sources, including basic pay, special and incentive 
pays, military healthcare, quality of life compensation, and reserve component 
compensation. The major findings in their analysis of the current retirement plan were 
threefold: (1) It defers too much compensation, making it appear to be inefficient; (2) it 
does not promote management of the force; and (3) it is not equitable because an 
overwhelming majority of the force does not meet the 20-year vesting requirement. As a 
result of their observations, the committee recommended extending military careers, 
allowing for earlier vesting, and introducing a program similar to the TSP in which the 
government matches service member contributions up to a certain percentage. In their 
final recommendations for cost savings, the DACMC constructed a three-tiered system 
consisting of a retirement annuity beginning at age 60, vesting at 10 YOS with a 
government match of 5% of base pay, and “gate pay,”3 separation pay or transition pay to 
produce required retention. Service branches would use tier three for Service-specific 
force management issues, while tiers one and two would be reserved for all Services 
(Henning, 2011). 
Concerning the DACMC’s recommendations, Philpott stated that “the April 
report from outside experts would not be the final word. Instead, the findings informed a 
                                                 
3 Gate pay is a form of additional pay or a bonus that is a multiple of basic pay and is payable at key 
years of service such as 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 years. It can vary from service member to service member in 




more extensive pay study about to get underway by the 10th Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation” (2006). 
2. 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (2008) 
In 2005, the 10th QRMC was tasked to undergo “a complete review of the 
principles and concepts of the compensation system for members of the uniformed 
Services.”  Concerning military retirement, the 10th QRMC took the recommendations 
(i.e., early vesting, age eligibility for retired pay, etc.) and modeled them based on survey 
feedback the committee received from actual service members. As a result of this 
approach, the QRMC developed a new proposal, slightly modified from the DACMC’s 
proposal (Henning, 2011). 
In their new proposal, service members would become vested in the DB and DC 
portions of the retirement system after 10 YOS. For the DB portion, a penalty would be 
given for retiring with less than 20 YOS. The penalty would delay a service member’s 
pension to age 60 versus age 57 for those who served more than 20 years. Those serving 
more than 20 years would have the option of receiving their pension sooner by accepting 
a 5% reduction for each year below age 57. The government-match percentage for the 
DC portion would be based on time in service. For less than a year of service, there 
would be a 0% match, a 2% match for two YOS, a 3% match for two to four YOS, a 4% 
match for four to five YOS, and a 5% for five or more YOS. As prescribed by the 
DACMC, the individual Services would control the conditions under which gate pay and 
separation pay were determined; however, predetermined milestones (e.g., 10 years, 15 
years, 20 years) would not be required, giving more flexibility to the Services based on 
their specific needs (Henning, 2011).  
In addition to the requirements described in this section, the QRMC advised the 
same retirement system for both active and reserves components, and a five year 
“demonstration project with a limited population to test and refine the proposal” 




3. Defense Business Board Military Compensation Task Group (2011) 
In May 2010, SECDEF, Robert Gates, tasked the DBB to “review current 
Department policies and practices and identify options to materially reduce overhead and 
increase the efficiency of the Department’s business operations.”  A task force was 
formed by Michael J. Bayer, Chairman of the DBB, who named Richard Spencer as the 
Military Retirement–Alternative Plans Task Group chair. The task group included six 
members and a staff analyst. During their research, the task group interviewed “the 
Department’s current senior leaders, former DoD and other government officials, several 
defense attachés from foreign ministries, and officials from institutes and government 
agencies” (DBB, 2011, p. 3). They considered both public and private analyses regarding 
military retirement over the past three decades. On July 21, 2011, the task group 
presented its findings to the full board (DBB, 2011). 
The task group’s findings, and subsequent recommendations, were a 
conglomeration of historical recommendations. The task group concluded that “the 
[current] system was designed in an era when life spans were shorter, draft era pay was 
substantially less than civilian sector pay, second careers were less common, and skills 
acquired during military service were not transferable to the private sector.”  The steady 
increase in retirement liability, particularly over the past 10 years, was due to the fact that 
retirement pay is connected directly to basic pay.  “As a result of these increases, today’s 
regular military compensation is higher than that of average civilians with the same level 
of education.”  Furthermore, where civilian sector 401(k) retirement contributions range 
from 4–12% per year, military retirement benefits equate to approximately 75% of annual 
pay per year (Henning, 2011). 
The task group drew three main conclusions from their study. First, the system is 
unfair because, due to the 20-year service requirement, only 17% of service members 
qualify for the lifetime retirement windfall. Second, force shaping is inflexible due to the 
design of the current military retirement system. According to the DoD Office of the 
Actuary, 75% of service members exit the service between 20 and 25 YOS due to cliff 




more of service.”  Finally, the military retirement system is unaffordable.  “In fiscal year 
2011, the retirement plan will accrue 33 cents for each dollar of current pay, for a total of 
$24 billion” (Henning, 2011, p. 5).   
The primary recommendation made by the task group was to transition from a DB 
plan to a DC plan. In addition to the service member’s own contributions, an unspecified 
government-match percentage would be invested into the service member’s TSP account. 
According to the task group’s final report, the match percentage would be “funded at a 
percentage level comparable to the highest end of a private sector pension plan.”  
Furthermore, “DoD contributions could vary depending on MOS, circumstances, such as 
larger contributions for personnel at risk or on hardship tours, needs of the service such as 
retention pay, or other force shaping purposes.”  Regarding vesting, a range of three to 
five years is offered, and the retirement account would be payable between “ages 60 to 65 
or the Social Security age.”  Like private sector 401(k) plans, there would be rights for 
survivorship and allowances for withdrawals under certain circumstances (e.g., education, 
healthcare, etc.). Reserve and active-duty personnel would qualify for the plan; retired 
and disabled personnel would not be affected. While the task group did not offer a 
specific recommendation on the implementation of their plan, their report includes two 
modeled scenarios: (1) all current military personnel grandfathered into the existing 
system; and (2) all military personnel immediately transitioned into new plan (Henning, 
2011). 
C. RECENT STUDIES OF MILITARY RETIREMENT REFORM 
As shown in the previous section, military retirement reform has been the subject 
of numerous studies, commissions, and legislation. In some cases, recommendations 
survive long enough to be sponsored by a Member of Congress and added into legislation. 
However, in most cases, they remain only as recommendations. Even for those 
recommendations surviving debate in Congress, most are stricken down in committee or 
on the floor. The following section provides an overview into recent studies and surveys 




1. Alternative Military Retirement Proposals  
In her thesis entitled Alternative Active Duty Retirement Plans, Schmidt (2011) 
combined elements of a DC plan and a DB plan using a Monte Carlo simulation and 
historical data to propose an alternative retirement plan. The primary alternative feature 
of this plan is a government contribution into the member’s TSP account in exchange for 
a reduction in retirement annuity upon retirement. A sensitivity analysis considered 
various independent factors on retirement such as career length and inflation. Results 
showed that the alternative plan provided both retiree benefits and cost savings to the 
government (Schmidt, 2011).  
In May 2012, The Center for American Progress (CAP) proposed a three-pronged 
approach to reducing the costs of military retirement. The CAP agreed with most critics 
of the current plan saying it was inequitable, inflexible, and unsustainable. A new 
retirement system would be based on a 401(k)-type plan used in the civilian sector. Those 
entering the Service at a designated date would be automatically enrolled in the new 
system. Service members with 10 or more years would have the option of being 
grandfathered into the current system or transitioning to the new system, while those with 
less than 10 years could transition into the new 401(k) plan or enroll in a hybrid of the 
current plan. Under the hybrid plan, service members would be vested at 10 years, but 
their retirement annuity percentage would be reduced from 50% to 40%, and benefits 
would not be payable until age 60 (Korb, Rothman, & Hoffman, 2012). 
The CAP report concluded that the DBB proposal contained legitimate 
recommendations for transitioning the military retirement system. The CAP also agreed 
that the government should follow the growing trend in the private sector and shift to a 
401(k) plan in order to cut increasing personnel costs (Korb, Rothman, & Hoffman, 
2012). 
In June 2012, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) released a report entitled 
Military Retirement Reform: Effects on Navy’s Personnel Structure and Costs. The 
purpose of the CNA report was to “study the retirement reform proposals developed by 




military retirement system could affect Navy costs and personnel.”  By modeling short- 
and long-run effects on Navy personnel and costs based on proposed reforms, the CNA 
estimated the dynamic effects of various reform scenarios and the effects of military 
retirement reform on the federal deficit (Grefer & Phillips, 2012).   
The CNA report concluded that by cutting Navy retirement by 20%, the potential 
annual savings was approximately $1.17 billion per year. However, savings would come 
at the price of a more junior Navy force in the officer and enlisted ranks. Additionally, 
anticipating that current service members would be grandfathered into the current 
retirement system, savings would be reduced incrementally until all new officer and 
enlisted accessions were under the new plan, estimated to be 30 years (Grefer & Phillips, 
2012).  
2. Surveys Regarding Retirement Reform and the DBB’s 
Recommendations 
During our research, two surveys were identified that solicited feedback from 
service members specifically regarding DBB recommendations. The first was conducted 
by the Fleet Reserve Association (FRA). According to the FRA website, “FRA is a 
congressionally chartered, non-profit organization that represents the interests of the Sea 
Service community before the U.S. Congress. Membership is comprised of current and 
former enlisted members of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.”  A press 
release issued October 24, 2011, by the FRA said that the online survey had over 1,700 
respondents comprised of current and former military service members. The survey was 
not released to the public, but several statistics from the survey were included in the press 
release, as follows (n.d.): 
• More than 80% of active-duty and reserve component respondents said that 
they would shorten their term of service if the retirement benefit were changed 
to reflect the DBB’s recommendations. 
• Respondents from the active-duty,reserve, retiree, and veteran communities 
overwhelmingly predicted that the DBB proposals would be bad for military. 
• More than 83% of participants believed fewer people would join the military 




In summary, any attempt to “civilianize” military retirement was considered not 
favorable to respondents of the FRA survey (“FRA Survey Reveals,” n.d.). 
The second DBB-related survey was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Brent 
Ruhlen (Army; 2012), a student at the Joint Forces Staff College. Included as part of his 
thesis entitled, Leading While Blindfolded: Examining the Defense Business Board’s 
Recommendations to Reform the Military Retirement System, Ruhlen’s (2012) online 
survey was open to active-duty service members and cadets/midshipmen from the service 
academies and ROTC programs; 114 active-duty service members and nine cadets 
participated. The author’s goal of the survey was to gain insight into three areas related to 
the respondents’ attitudes about the DBB proposals. First was the influence of the current 
military retirement system on the individual’s decision to join the military. The second 
area was the individual’s military tenure intentions should Congress reform the military 
retirement system based on the DBB recommendations. Finally, the survey was expected 
to gauge the respondent’s opinion regarding the fairness of the current system and the 
fairness of the system proposed in the DBB plan (Ruhlen, 2012). The following statistics 
highlight some of the notable responses in the survey: 
• 61% of respondents responded negatively towards a shift to a defined 
contribution plan from a defined benefit plan.  
• 45% of mid-career respondents (8 to 12 YOS) said that they were less likely 
to continue serving until retirement under a defined contribution plan; 27% 
said they would definitely not serve until retirement. 
• 78% of respondents who are currently eligible for retirement said that they 
would leave at the earliest opportunity rather than remain in the military 
should the DBB proposal be implemented. 
• 73% support a gradual transition to a defined contribution plan should it be 
implemented (Ruhlen, 2012). 
While none of our survey questions were identical to Ruhlen’s, other than 
demographic, his survey questionnaire provided a starting point in the development of 









III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
Our model simulated the potential wealth accumulation for an active-duty military 
officer and an enlisted service member hypothetically participating within the defined 
contribution retirement plan advocated by the 2011 DBB Military Compensation Task 
Group. The counterfactual model used historical data for military salaries and TSP fund 
return rates that coincided with the time period from January 1, 1991, through December 
31, 2010. This model gave service members insights about the prospective earnings of an 
alternative non-disability defined contribution retirement system compared to the current 
DB plan. For each representative service member, the results were compared to the single 
lump-sum equivalent, or NPV, of all retirement annuity payments that he or she would 
receive under the existing High-3 DB retirement system, based on the average age of 
death, as specified in the DoD Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on the Military 
Retirement System Fiscal Year 2010. Note that this report was used because it specified 
the lump-sum equivalent, or NPV, of the retirement annuities for service members 
retiring December 31, 2010.  
A. HISTORICAL DATA 
1. Pay Contributions 
The Defense Financial and Accounting Service (DFAS) website provided 
historical salary data for military personnel and was used to calculate the total TSP 
contributions per month (http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements 
/militarypaytables.html). We used the pay data for two categories of active-duty military 
personnel: (1) a military officer and (2) an enlisted service member. The TSP 
contributions were derived only from basic pay, exclusive of any other special pay or 
entitlements.   
In our model, we assumed a dollar-for-dollar government-matching contribution 
rate up to 8% of salary. This rate was selected because it represented the median value of 




allotting 8% of their income towards the TSP received an additional 8% from the 
government for a combined total of 16% in TSP contributions per month. We also 
assumed that the monthly contribution rate remained constant through both service 
members’ careers. The initial contributions at 16% for officer and enlisted personnel, 
starting on January 1, 1991, are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Initial Pay Contributions 
 
The salary data from January 1, 1991, through December 31, 2010, was used 
because they represent a service member’s career progression through 20 years of active-
duty service. 
2. TSP Funds 
The TSP funds represent investments in the following categories:  
• The Common Stock Index Investment Fund (C Fund) invests in stocks 
that comprise the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500). As of December 31, 
2011, the C Fund earned a return rate of 9.23% since its inception on 
January 29, 1988, compared to the S&P 500 Index of 9.45% for the same 
period (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, 2011a). 
• The Fixed Income Index Investment Fund (F Fund), as the name implies, 
invests in fixed-income securities. The Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board invests in an index fund that tracks the Barclays Capital 
U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, which was formerly known as the Lehman 
Brothers U.S. Aggregate Index. As of December 31, 2011, the F Fund, 
earned 7.12% in returns since its inception on January 29, 1988, compared 
to the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index of 7.37% for the same period 
(Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, 2011b). 
• The Government Securities Investment Fund (G Fund) invests in short-
term non-marketable U.S. Treasury securities that are specifically issued 
to the TSP. The U.S. government guarantees the payment of the principle 
and interest. As of December 31, 2011, the G Fund earned a return rate of 
5.86% since its inception on April 1, 1987 (Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board, 2011c).  
Pay Grade Monthly Basic 
Pay 






O1 1,444.20 115.54 115.54 231.08 




• The International Stock Index Investment Fund (I Fund) invests in 
international stocks traded in the European, Australian, and Asian stock 
markets. The benchmark index is the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
EAFE (Europe, Australasia, Far East) Index. As of December 31, 2011, 
the I Fund earned 2.79% since its inception on May 1, 2001, compared to 
its benchmark index of 2.80% (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment 
Board, 2011d).  
• The Small Capitalization Stock Index Investment Fund (S Fund) invests in 
an index of U.S. common stocks excluding those that are held in the C 
Fund. The S Fund tracks the Dow Jones U.S. Completion TSM Index 
which represents approximately 25% of the market value of the U.S. Stock 
Market. As of December 31, 2011, the S Fund earned a return rate of 
6.11% since its inception on May 1, 2001, compared to the Dow Jones 
U.S. Completion TSM Index of 6.14% (Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board, 2011e). 
 
The historical monthly and annual return rates for these funds were found on the 
TSP website. For brevity, the annual return rates are shown in Table 2.  However, for this 
model, we used monthly compounding and used the actual historical return rates to 
calculate the gains or losses for each service members’ investment portfolio.  
Table 2.   Annual Returns With Standard Deviations for TSP G, F, C, S, and I Funds 
  G Fund F Fund C Fund S Fund I Fund 
1991 8.15% 15.74% 30.76%     
1992 7.24% 7.21% 7.71%     
1993 6.13% 9.52% 10.12%     
1994 7.22% -2.97% 1.33%     
1995 7.03% 18.30% 37.39%     
1996 6.76% 3.66% 22.85%     
1997 6.76% 9.61% 33.17%     
1998 5.76% 8.74% 28.44%     
1999 5.99% -0.86% 20.95%     
2000 6.42% 11.65% -9.14%     
2001 5.39% 8.57% -11.95% -9.03% -21.94% 
2002 4.99% 10.27% -22.04% -18.14% -15.96% 
2003 4.14% 4.10% 28.52% 42.91% 37.92% 
2004 4.29% 4.30% 10.79% 18.03% 20.01% 
2005 4.49% 2.41% 4.96% 10.48% 13.63% 
2006 4.94% 4.39% 15.80% 15.32% 26.31% 
2007 4.87% 7.08% 5.55% 5.50% 11.44% 
2008 3.73% 5.46% -37.00% -38.32% -42.43% 
2009 3.00% 6.00% 26.68% 34.83% 30.04% 
2010 2.81% 6.71% 15.06% 29.08% 7.94% 
2011 2.46% 7.89% 2.12% -3.40% -11.81% 




Additionally, from these historical values, we calculated the standard deviations 
and correlations. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.  and depicts the degree of 
relationship between any two funds. Values closer to +1 or -1 denote a strong linear 
relationship; values close to 0 denote no relationship (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). 
For example, the S Fund and the C Fund showed a high degree of correlation (0.937), 
whereas the I Fund and F Fund showed no correlation (0.00774). The annual return rates 
and the degrees of correlation are shown in Figure 3 
 
Table 3.   Correlation Matrix for TSP Funds (1991–2010) 
Correlation G Fund F Fund C Fund S Fund I Fund 
G Fund 1 - - - - 
F Fund 0.152350488 1 - - - 
C Fund 0.07082482 0.157930672 1 - - 
S Fund -0.131092999 -0.117984566 0.937083565 1 - 




Figure 3. Annual Returns for TSP G, F, C, S, and I Investment Funds 
(1998–2011) 
B. INVESTMENT TIME HORIZON  
Other important considerations for retirement savings are an investor’s time 
horizon and risk tolerance. The time horizon represents the duration in which an 




individual’s willingness to lose a portion or all of their investments in exchange for 
greater future returns (Securities Exchange Commission [SEC], 2009). Generally, both 
considerations are complimentary; investors with longer time horizons are more likely to 
be risk tolerant, whereas investors with shorter time horizons are less risk tolerant. For 
our model, we assumed an investment time horizon of 20 years and a high degree of risk 
tolerance because of the investor’s age. 
C. PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION 
There are various opinions about how to diversify investment fund portfolios. For 
aggressive investors, Investopedia.com advocates a portfolio comprised of 80% to 100% 
stocks, 0% to 10% bonds, and 0% to 10% cash and equivalents. Conversely, for 
conservative investors, Investopedia advocates a portfolio comprised of 70% to 75% 
bonds, 15% to 20% stocks, and/or 5% to 15% cash and equivalents (Carther, 2009). 
Similarly, SmartMoney.com advocates that an investor’s age represent the percentage 
allocation for bond funds with the remaining difference allocated to stock funds 
(SmartMoney, 2011). For example, a 23-year-old investor would have a portfolio 
comprised of 77% stock funds and 23% bonds funds. Applying both principles, an 
extremely aggressive portfolio would consist entirely of stock funds, whereas an 
extremely conservative portfolio would consist entirely of bond funds. Of course, there 
are more complicated techniques that an investor can use to obtain higher returns. But, 
given the limitations of staying within TSP, we focused on the following three investment 
portfolio scenarios: 
• a retirement portfolio advocated by Investopedia and consisting of 90% 
stock assets and 10% bond assets;   
• a retirement portfolio similar to what SmartMoney.com advocates in 
which the investor’s age corresponds to the percentage allocated to bond 
funds and the remainder to stock funds per year; and 






For these various portfolios, we assumed all gains or losses were carried forward 
throughout the entire investment period; there were no withdrawals. Additionally, for 
each year, we also assumed that only two TSP investment funds were considered: one 
stock fund and one bond fund.  
D. CAREER PROGRESSION 
For our model, we only considered two categories of active-duty personnel: (1) a 
military officer and (2) an enlisted service member; no warrant officers and no prior-
enlisted members receiving an officer commission were considered. For simplicity, the 
model only required that the personnel satisfied the minimum time requirements in each 
pay grade before advancing to their next respective pay grades. There was no 
consideration for factors such as promotion board results, performance evaluations, and 
duty assignments. We assumed that both categories of personnel entered military service 
on January 1, 1991, and retired on December 31, 2010. We also assumed that promotions 
for both categories of personnel occurred on January 1 of each year.  
We assumed that enlisted personnel entered military service at 20 years old and at 
the E1 pay grade. Since the average time in grade varied amongst the Services, this 
model assumed the career progression shown in Table 4.  (Powers, 2012). For example, 
an enlisted service member advancing from E1 to E2 accumulated approximately nine 
months in service; an enlisted member advancing from E7 to E8 served 12 years of active 
duty, and so forth. For simplicity, any time in grade that was less than a year was rounded 





Table 4.   Enlisted Personnel Career Progression 
Pay 
Grade 




E1 9 .75 
E2 9 1.5 
E3 6 2 
E4 12 3 
E5 36 6 
E6 36 9 
E7 36 12 
E8 36 15 
E9 36 18 
 
Likewise, we also assumed that an officer followed a career progression that 
fulfilled the minimum time requirements for each pay grade, as shown in Table 5.  We 
assumed that the officer was commissioned as an O1 at age 23. By the time an officer 
advanced from O1 to O2, then the officer would have accumulated two years of active-
duty service. Similarly, by the time that the officer attained the O5 pay grade, then the 
officer would have served at least 16 years of active-duty service. Conceivably, an officer 





Table 5.   Officer Career Progression  
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [OUSD(P&R)], 
2009) 
Pay Grade 




O1 2 2 
O2 2 4 
O3 4 8 
O4 3 10 +/- 1 year 
O5 3 16 +/- 1 year 
O6 3 22 +/- 1 year 
 
E. LIFE EXPECTANCY 
The DoD Office of the Actuary’s Statistical Report on the Military Retirement 
System Fiscal Year 2010, specified the life expectancies for military retirees, as shown in 
Table 6.  For example, a male enlisted retiree is expected to live another 39 years before 
dying at age 79. Male officers lived slightly longer, but female officers lived the most 
years after retirement (DoD Office of the Actuary, 2011). 
 
Table 6.   Life Expectancy for Military Retirees [Yrs] 
Category Age at 
Retirement 
Male Avg Age at 
Death 
Female Avg Age at 
Death 
Enlisted 40 38.8 79 41.6 82 




F. LUMP-SUM EQUIVALENT VALUE OF NON-DISABILITY 
 RETIREMENT PAY AT TIME OF RETIREMENT FOR PERSONS 
 RETIRING IN 2012 
The DoD Office of the Actuary statistical report also specified the NPV of the 
retirement pension received throughout a retiree’s lifetime following 20 years of active-
duty service. These values are shown in Table 7. The lump-sum-equivalent is the “the 
amount of money required to be on hand at the time of retirement to pay a lifetime 
annuity that increases with inflation at 3% annually. The interest rate used in discounting 
to the present value is 5.75% resulting in what is commonly referred to as a real interest 
rate of 2.75%. Longevity is based on military specific tables that assume an entry age of 
23 for commissioned officers and warrant officers and an entry age of 20 for enlisted 
members” (DoD Office of the Actuary, 2011). The researchers interpreted that the DoD 
Actuary increased the annuity payments by 3% each year, which corresponded to the 
increase in inflation. 
 
Table 7.   Lump-Sum Equivalent of Retirement Pension Calculated Immediately at 
Retirement [20 Years Active Duty]   











IV. MODEL OUTPUTS 
Our model generated the following outcomes described in this chapter. All 
models were comprised of the same stock and bond funds, but varied in the methodology 
for allocating the pay contributions between the asset categories. Note that the tables in 
this chapter summarized the service member’s TSP contributions and gains on an annual 
basis.  
A. OFFICER MODEL OUTPUTS 
1. 90/10 Model 
Table 8.  represents the outcome of a military officer contributing 16% (8% service 
member contribution, 8% government matched) of his or her base salary in an investment 
portfolio that is comprised of 90% stock assets and 10% bond assets. The respective 
stock and bond asset funds for each year were selected on the basis of the highest annual 
returns in their respective categories. At the end of 20 YOS, a military officer 






















1991 O1 17330 2773 C 347  F 27  3147 
1992 O1 18058 2889 C 393  G 37  6466 
1993 O2 23551 3768 C 763  F 75  11071 
1994 O2 28922 4628 C 184  G 99  15982 
1995 O3 34297 5488 C 6259  F 340  28069 
1996 O3 35122 5619 C 6437  G 211  40335 
1997 O3 37908 6065 C 12872  F 425  59698 
1998 O3 38970 6235 C 16213  F 551  82697 
1999 O4 43304 6929 C 16399  G 518  106543 
2000 O4 45382 7261 C (9224) F 1297  105878 
2001 O4 52916 8467 S (8500) F 939  106783 
2002 O4 56354 9017 I (16090) F 1152  100862 
2003 O4 62417 9987 S 41361  G 440  152650 
2004 O5 67234 10757 I 28985  F 684  193077 
2005 O5 72583 11613 I 24878  G 895  230463 
2006 O5 74833 11973 I 56039  G 1170  299646 
2007 O5 81317 13011 I 31239  F 2182  346077 
2008 O5 84164 13466 S (118379) F 1946  243110 
2009 O5 89921 14387 S 79719  F 1509  338726 
2010 O5 92977 14876 S 91463  F 2303  447368 
 
Note that there were several years in which the retirement portfolio lost value in 
its stock assets. The year 2000 marked the collapse of the “dot-com” or tech bubble. 
Consequently, the portfolio lost 0.62% of its value from the preceding year. In that year, 
the common stock C Fund returned -9.14%, while the government fixed securities F Fund 
returned 11.65%. The portfolio’s cumulative value in stock assets was reduced by $9,224. 
The combined value of the service member’s annual TSP contribution ($7,261) and the 
gains in the F Fund ($1,297) was not sufficient to compensate for that year’s losses.  
Similarly, corporate scandals such as Enron and Arthur Andersen occurred in 
2001 along with the September 11th terrorist attacks which further eroded consumer 




consequently, the investment portfolio lost $8,500 in stock asset values. For comparison, 
the other stock funds, C Fund and I Fund, lost -11.95% and -21.94%, respectively. 
However, unlike the year 2000, the losses in the stock assets were slightly offset by gains 
in the F Fund and the service member’s annual TSP contribution, $939 and $8,467, 
respectively. From the year 2000 to 2001, there was only a 0.85% gain in the portfolio 
value.  
The year 2008 marked the sub-prime housing crisis and the housing bubble. The 
C Fund returned -37%, which reduced the value in portfolio stock assets by $118,379. In 
the subsequent year, 2009, the portfolio regained 39.3% to a cumulative value of 
$338,726. The final value of the officer’s retirement portfolio on December 31, 2010, 
was $447,368.  
2. SmartMoney Model 
Table 9.  displays the outcome of a military officer contributing 16% of his or her 
base salary in a retirement portfolio that varied the bond assets allocation according to the 
officer’s age. Recall that a hypothetical military officer in our study entered service at the 
age of 23. Hence, the initial portfolio allocation would be comprised of 23% bond assets 
and 77% stock assets. Each subsequent year increased the bond assets by 1% with a 
corresponding decrease in stock assets; the second year consisted of 24% bond assets 
with 76% stock assets, and so forth. The final portfolio allocation in 2010 consisted of 43% 
bond assets and 57% stock assets. As with the 90/10 model, the respective stock and 
bond asset funds for each year were selected on the basis of the highest annual returns. In 
this scenario, the military officer accumulated $414,996 in retirement savings and also 



























1991 O1 17330 2773 C 297  F 63  3133 
1992 O1 18058 2889 C 331  G 87  6440 
1993 O2 23551 3768 C 634  F 186  11028 
1994 O2 28922 4628 C 151  G 256  16063 
1995 O3 34297 5488 C 5099  F 923  27572 
1996 O3 35122 5619 C 5068  G 580  38839 
1997 O3 37908 6065 C 9802  F 1191  55898 
1998 O3 38970 6235 C 11854  F 1552  75539 
1999 O4 43304 6929 C 11538  G 1474  95481 
2000 O4 45382 7261 C (6282) F 3737  100197 
2001 O4 52916 8467 S (5984) F 2937  105616 
2002 O4 56354 9017 I (11676) F 3876  106833 
2003 O4 62417 9987 S 31537  G 1627  149984 
2004 O5 67234 10757 I 20270  F 2422  183434 
2005 O5 72583 11613 I 16587  G 3152  214786 
2006 O5 74833 11973 I 36047  G 4152  266959 
2007 O5 81317 13011 I 18891  F 7606  306467 
2008 O5 84164 13466 C (70127) F 6920  256726 
2009 O5 89921 14387 S 55058  F 6520  332693 
2010 O5 92977 14876 S 57925  F 9502  414996 
 
In the year 2000, the stock assets comprised 68% of the portfolio and consisted 
primarily of the C Fund, which had lost $6,282 in value. However, these losses were 
offset by a $3,737 gain in the F Fund, in addition to the service member’s $7,261 TSP 
contribution. Unlike the previous 90/10-portfolio model, this “SmartMoney” portfolio 
gained 4.9% from the previous year.  
There were also losses in the stock assets in 2001 and 2002, $5,984 and $11,676, 
respectively, but the losses were offset by gains resulting from the increased bond asset 
allocations and reduced stock asset allocations. Again, in 2008, the stock assets lost 
$70,127. But this total portfolio value only decreased 16.2% from the preceding year, 




3. Sharpe Ratio Model 
Table 10.  also represents the outcome of a military officer contributing 16% of 
his or her base salary in an investment portfolio that is comprised of 90% stock assets and 
10% bond assets. For this hypothetical portfolio, the 3-month Treasury bill interest rate 
was used to calculate the Sharpe Ratio for the various stock assets and bond assets funds 
for each year. The respective TSP stock and bond asset funds were then selected based 
upon the highest Sharpe Ratio value, which signified the best efficient portfolio that 
maximized the return to risk ratio (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). At the end of 20 
years of active-duty service, a military officer accumulated $429,951 in retirement 
savings and attained the O5 pay grade. 
 


















1991 O1 17330 2773 C 347  G 12  3132 
1992 O1 18058 2889 C 392  G 34  6446 
1993 O2 23551 3768 C 761  G 52  11027 
1994 O2 28922 4628 C 184  G 98  15937 
1995 O3 34297 5488 C 6244  G 132  27800 
1996 O3 35122 5619 C 6381  G 209  40010 
1997 O3 37908 6065 C 12775  G 292  59142 
1998 O3 38970 6235 C 16071  G 359  81807 
1999 O4 43304 6929 C 16232  G 513  105481 
2000 O4 45382 7261 C (9136) G 702  104307 
2001 O4 52916 8467 S (8372) G 586  104988 
2002 O4 56354 9017 I (15832) G 547  98720 
2003 O4 62417 9987 S 40534  G 431  149672 
2004 O5 67234 10757 I 28449  G 668  189545 
2005 O5 72583 11613 I 24445  G 879  226483 
2006 O5 74833 11973 I 55097  G 1150  294703 
2007 O5 81317 13011 I 30730  G 1468  339911 
2008 O5 84164 13466 S (120652) G 1296  234021 
2009 O5 89921 14387 S 76870  G 726  326005 





There were also losses in the stock assets in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The 
portfolio balance decreased 1.1% from 1999 to 2000, gained 0.65% in 2001, but lost 6.0% 
the following year in 2002. The greatest loss, $120,652, in stock assets occurred in 2008 
resulting in a portfolio decrease of 31.2%.   
B. ENLISTED MODEL OUTPUTS 
1. 90/10 Model 
Table 11.  represents the outcome of an enlisted service member contributing 16% 
(8% service member contribution, 8% government matched) of his or her base salary in 
an investment portfolio that is comprised of 90% stock assets and 10% bond assets. The 
respective stock and bond asset funds for each year were selected on the basis of the 
highest annual returns. At the end of 20 years of active-duty service, an enlisted service 























1991 E1 9047 1447 C 181  F 14  1643  
1992 E2 10566 1691 C 216  G 20  3569  
1993 E3 12013 1922 C 414  F 41  5946  
1994 E4 13813 2210 C 96  G 52  8304  
1995 E5 16182 2589 C 3210  F 175  14278  
1996 E5 16571 2651 C 3250  G 106  20285  
1997 E5 18191 2911 C 6454  F 213  29862  
1998 E6 20617 3299 C 8137  F 276  41575  
1999 E6 22129 3541 C 8251  G 261  53627  
2000 E6 23191 3711 C (4646) F 653  53345  
2001 E7 28548 4568 S (4279) F 474  54108  
2002 E7 31741 5079 I (8195) F 587  51578  
2003 E7 34060 5450 S 21234  G 226  78487  
2004 E8 39676 6348 I 15017  F 354  100206  
2005 E8 42325 6772 I 12988  G 466  120433  
2006 E8 43636 6982 I 29373  G 613  157401  
2007 E9 53514 8562 I 16460  F 1,154  183577  
2008 E9 55386 8862 C (63196) F 1,040  130283  
2009 E9 59339 9494 S 43157  F 815  183748  
2010 E9 61355 9817 S 49946  F 1,253  244764  
 
Like the other model portfolios, there were also similar decreases in the stock 
asset values in the years 2000–2002 and 2008. The portfolio decreased 0.53% from 1999 
to 2000, increased 1.4% from 2000 to 2001, and decreased 4.7% in 2002. In 2008, the 
portfolio decreased 29% in value.  
2. SmartMoney Model 
Table 12.  displays the outcome of an enlisted service member contributing 16% 
of his or her base salary in a retirement portfolio that varied the bond assets allocation 
according to the enlisted service member’s age. Recall that an enlisted service member 
entered service at the age of 20. Hence, the initial portfolio allocation would be 




bond assets by 1% with a corresponding decrease in stock assets; the second year 
consisted of 21% bond assets with 79% stock assets, and so forth. Also, the respective 
stock and bond asset funds for each year were selected on the basis of the highest annual 
returns. The final portfolio allocation in 2010 consisted of 40% bond assets and 60% 
stock assets. In this scenario, an enlisted service member accumulated $229,991 in 
retirement savings and also attained the pay grade of E9.  
 


















1991 E1 9047 1447 C 161  F 28  1637  
1992 E2 10566 1691 C 189  G 42  3559  
1993 E3 12013 1922 C 358  F 89  5928  
1994 E4 13813 2210 C 82  G 119  8339  
1995 E5 16182 2589 C 2721  F 421  14069  
1996 E5 16571 2651 C 2672  G 262  19655  
1997 E5 18191 2911 C 5152  F 538  28256  
1998 E6 20617 3299 C 6267  F 708  38529  
1999 E6 22129 3541 C 6142  G 679  48891  
2000 E6 23191 3711 C (3358) F 1734  50977  
2001 E7 28548 4568 S (3178) F 1361  53727  
2002 E7 31741 5079 I (6241) F 1807  54372  
2003 E7 34060 5450 S 16858  G 760  77440  
2004 E8 39676 6348 I 11039  F 1153  95980  
2005 E8 42325 6772 I 9145  G 1522  113419  
2006 E8 43636 6982 I 20014  G 2026  142440  
2007 E9 53514 8562 I 10609  F 3773  165385  
2008 E9 55386 8862 C (39997) F 3479  137729  
2009 E9 59339 9494 S 31338  F 3266  181827  
2010 E9 61355 9817 S 33512  F 4835  229991  
 
 
In the year 2000, the stock assets comprised 71% of the portfolio and consisted 
primarily of the C Fund, which had lost $3,358 in value. However, these losses were 




contribution. Unlike the previous 90/10-portfolio model, this SmartMoney portfolio 
gained 4.3% from the previous year. 
There were also losses in the stock assets in 2001 and 2002, $3,178 and $6,241, 
respectively, but the losses were offset by gains resulting from the increased bond asset 
allocations and reduced stock asset allocations. Again, in 2008, the stock assets lost 
$39,997. But this total portfolio value only decreased 16.8% from the preceding year, 
compared to the 29.0% loss of the 90/10 portfolio.  
3. Sharpe Ratio Model 
Table 13.  also represents the outcome of an enlisted service member contributing 
16% of his or her base salary in an investment portfolio that is comprised of 90% stock 
assets and 10% bond assets. For this hypothetical portfolio, which was similar to the 
officer model, the 3-month Treasury bill interest rate was used to calculate the Sharpe 
Ratio for the various stock assets and bond assets funds for each year. The respective TSP 
stock and bond asset funds were then selected based upon the highest Sharpe Ratio value, 
which signified the best efficient portfolio that maximized the return to risk ratio (Brealey, 
Myers, & Allen, 2011). At the end of 20 years of active-duty service, an enlisted service 























1991 E1 9047 1447 C 181  F 6  1635  
1992 E2 10566 1691 C 215  G 18  3559  
1993 E3 12013 1922 C 413  F 28  5922  
1994 E4 13813 2210 C 96  G 52  8279  
1995 E5 16182 2589 C 3202  F 68  14138  
1996 E5 16571 2651 C 3221  G 105  20116  
1997 E5 18191 2911 C 6404  F 146  29576  
1998 E6 20617 3299 C 8064  F 180  41119  
1999 E6 22129 3541 C 8165  G 258  53083  
2000 E6 23191 3711 C (4601) F 353  52546  
2001 E7 28548 4568 S (4214) F 296  53196  
2002 E7 31741 5079 I (8064) F 279  50489  
2003 E7 34060 5450 S 20813  G 221  76972  
2004 E8 39676 6348 I 14744  F 345  98410  
2005 E8 42325 6772 I 12768  G 458  118408  
2006 E8 43636 6982 I 28894  G 603  154887  
2007 E9 53514 8562 I 16201  F 776  180426  
2008 E9 55386 8862 C (64479) F 691  125500  
2009 E9 59339 9494 S 41658  F 393  177045  
2010 E9 61355 9817 S 48192  F 510  235564  
 
There were also losses in the stock assets in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The 
portfolio balance decreased 1.0% from 1999 to 2000, gained 1.2% in 2001, but lost 5.1% 
the following year in 2002. The greatest loss, $64,479, in stock assets occurred in 2008, 
resulting in a portfolio decrease of 30.4%.   
C. MODEL SUMMARY 
The various model outputs are summarized in Table 14.  The military officer 
accumulated on average 37.5% of the NPV of the current defined benefit system. 
Likewise, the enlisted service member accumulated on average 31.9% of the NPV of the 

















90/10 447368 1148139 39.0% 244764 742458 33.0% 
SmartMoney 414996 1148139 36.1% 229991 742458 31.0% 
Sharpe Ratio 429951 1148139 37.4% 235564 742458 31.7% 
 
Our model also provided other insights regarding wealth accumulation for 
variations of the portfolio models under the proposed DC system as shown in Table 15.   
For example, consider the 90/10 model: If an officer maximized his or her annual TSP 
contributions according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) elective deferrals limits with 
no government-matching funds, then the retirement portfolio was worth $741,100 after 
20 YOS, which represented 64.5% of the NPV of all annuities received under the existing 
DB system (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, 2012). Unlike a constant 8% 
($1,386/$17,330 for an O1 at one YOS; $7,438/$92,977 for an O5 at 20 YOS) base pay 
annual contribution throughout a career, this model assumed an initial 49% 
($8,475/$17,330 for an O1 at one YOS) annual salary contribution an ending 18% 
($16,500/$92,977 for an O5 at 20 YOS) salary contribution rate at retirement. Note that 
as the officer advanced in his or her career, their annual TSP contribution rate decreased 
because the elective deferral limit composed a smaller proportion of their annual salary.  
Still, consider an additional scenario in which an officer maximized his or her 
annual TSP contribution according to the IRS limits and also received an 8% dollar-for-
dollar government-matching contribution; then, their accumulated retirement savings 
would be $800,400, which represented 69.7% of the NPV under the existing DB system.  
In order to surpass the NPV of the current defined benefit system, the government 
would have to provide slightly greater than 4-to-1 matching contribution rate throughout 
an officer’s career, that is, 8% service member contribution plus 32% government 
contribution for a combined total of 40% of annual salary. Under this scenario, the 
accumulated savings would then be $1,118,420, or 97.4% of the NPV of the existing DB 




Table 15.   Modified Officer Portfolio Scenarios 
Modified Portfolio Military Officer NPV Fraction of NPV 
Max TSP service member 
contributions only 
741,100 1,148,139 64.5% 
Max TSP contributions + 8% 
government match 
800,400 1,148,139 69.7% 
4-to-1 matching contribution 
ratio 






V. SURVEY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The survey was conducted via Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com). Two 
populations were surveyed separately: active-duty Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
students and II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel. Each survey was open for 
two weeks. NPS students were solicited via their respective program officer and the NPS 
muster page.4  II MEF participation was coordinated through the II MEF adjutant who 
solicited participation through two e-mail requests (initial and reminder) sent to II MEF 
major subordinate commands. The survey consisted of 37 questions and was designed to 
garner service member’s understanding of current and proposed changes to military 
retirement. There were 350 total participants. 
B. U.S. MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS 
In March 2012, the DoD Statistical Information Analysis Division reported that 
there were 1,452,939 active-duty personnel serving in the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marines, and Coast Guard. The breakdown by service is as follows: Army (557,780 or 
38.4%), Navy (320,961 or 22.1%), Air Force (332,709 or 22.9%), Marines (198,427 or 
13.7%), and Coast Guard (43,062 or 2.9%). 
The officer and enlisted breakdown by service is as follows: Army (18% officer, 
82% enlisted), Navy (16% officer, 84% enlisted), Air Force (19.2% officer, 80.8% 
enlisted), Marine Corps (11% officer, 89% enlisted), and Coast Guard (19.3% officer, 
80.7% enlisted). 
C. NPS RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
Two hundred and thirty-eight (238) active-duty NPS students and/or faculty 
participated in the survey; eight respondents did not complete the survey. Figure 4 shows 
the service branch distribution for the NPS survey respondents. According to the 2012 
                                                 




NPS Fact Book, in 20ll, the NPS resident military student population was 1,647, with a 
distribution of 59.7% Navy, 14.9%, Marine Corps, 13.5%, Air Force 11.8%, and other 
0.1%.   
 
 
Figure 4. Service Branches of NPS Respondents 
The rank distribution of NPS survey participants is shown in Table 15. 






02 6 2.6% 
03 131 56.2% 
04 80 34.8% 
05 12 5.2% 
06 1 0.4% 
Other5 2 0.8% 
 
                                                 



















The average age of respondents was 33.6 years.  91.1% of the respondents were 
male, and 9.9% of the respondents were female. The average YOS was 11.7 years.  61% 
of respondents held an undergraduate degree, while 34% had a graduate-level degree. Six 
respondents had attained a doctoral degree. The primary specialty of approximately 34% 
of respondents was considered combat6; the balance of respondents served in supporting 
roles.  
D. II MEF RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
One hundred and twelve (112) service members assigned to units within the II 
MEF participated in the survey; seven respondents did not complete the survey. Ninety-
six percent (96%) of the participants were Marines; 4% represented other services 
attached to Marine units. Forty-eight percent (48%) of respondents were officers and 52% 
were enlisted. According to the II MEF website, II MEF consists of 62,000 Marines and 
sailors (“II MEF,” n.d.). The rank category distribution of survey participants is shown in 
Table 16. 
 






Junior Enlisted 13 11.6% 
Senior Enlisted 45 40.2% 
Warrant Officer 3 2.6% 
Junior Officer 34 30.4% 
Senior Officer 17 15.2% 
 
                                                 
6 For this study, combat specialties included infantry, armor, artillery, special forces, special warfare, 
Navy aviators and crew, and Marine Corps fighter/attack pilots. 
7 Category ranks were grouped as follows: junior enlisted = E1 to E5, senior enlisted = E6 to E9, 




The average age of respondents was 33.7 years.  97.3% of the respondents were 
male, 2.7% of the respondents were female. The average years of active-duty service was 
12.5 years. Seventeen percent of respondents held a high school degree/GED, 27% had 
some college, 37% held an undergraduate degree, and 16% held a graduate degree. Three 
respondents had attained a doctoral degree. The primary specialty of approximately 25% 
of respondents was considered combat; the balance of respondents served in supporting 
roles. 
E. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
This section summarized major points from our survey. The survey was divided 
into sections that solicited service members’ attitudes toward and knowledge of the 
current retirement system and proposed changes to the system. Additionally, the survey 
solicited feedback on service member TSP contributions and the fairness of the current 
retirement system. Blank responses were not considered in response calculations. The 
complete survey questionnaire is shown in Appendix B.   
1. Responses to General Retirement Questions 
• On average, respondents were undecided on whether or not they planned to 
serve until retirement before entering the service. Responses broken down by 
percentage were as follows: 19%—yes, will definitely serve until retirement; 
18%—somewhat certain will serve until retirement; 29%—undecided; 21%—
probably will not serve until retirement; and 13%—no, definitely will not 
serve until retirement. 
• The average YOS of respondents was 11.9 years; for officers, the average 
YOS was 11.5 years, and for enlisted, 13.9 years. 
• On average, respondents planned to serve an additional 9.12 years; for officers 
the average was 9.5 years, and for enlisted the average was 7.17 years. 
• 75.8% of respondents said that today, military retirement compensation was a 
very positive factor in influencing their decision to stay in the military until 
retirement. 
• When responses were ranked as none (1), very little (2), some (3), and very 
much (4), respondents on average said that they know between “very little” 




Broken down by service branch, the average rankings were as follows: 
Marines—1.48, Navy—1.70, Air Force—1.50, and Army—1.73. 
• 83.8% of respondents said that they care very much about the potential 
changes to military retirement. 
2. Responses to Proposed Changes to the Military Retirement System 
Questions 
• 77.3% of respondents preferred a DB plan over a DC plan. 
• 88.2% of respondents would prefer a gradual transition to a new retirement 
plan (i.e., would prefer to be grandfathered). 
• When asked what the government could offer respondents under a DC plan so 
that they would be willing to serve as long under a DB plan, responses were as 
follows: 60.2%—monetary (e.g., increased base pay, bonuses, gate pay); 
15.2%—non-monetary (e.g., improved healthcare, duty station preference); 
18.3%—both monetary and non-monetary; and 6.3%—other. Blank responses 
were omitted. 
3. Responses to Fairness Questions 
• 69.8% of respondents said that it is fair that only 17% of active-duty military 
members will serve long enough to receive a retirement pension (serve 20 
years). 
• 88.2% of respondents said that it is fair that retired military members are able 
to start drawing a pension as soon as they retire, while most civilians must 
wait until they are age 60–65. 
• When asked what a “fair” government match would be under a defined 
contribution plan, the average response was 11.52%. Responses containing 
erroneous values (e.g., 100%) were omitted. 
4. Responses to Thrift Savings Plan Questions 
• 62.6% of respondents invest in the TSP; 5.5% was the average investment 
percentage; eight respondents said that they max out their annual 
contributions. 
• 53.8% of respondents never make modifications to their TSP fund allocations. 
• 77% of respondents said that they would either start to contribute or increase 
their current TSP contributions if the government offered a match. 
• When asked how many years the respondent would expect to serve before 




• 81.3% of respondents said that they would significantly, somewhat, or slightly 
increase their retirement savings if the current retirement system were 
changed to a DC plan. 
 
F. SELECTED IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 
1. Influence of Stressors and DC Retirement Plan on Likelihood to 
Leave the Service  
Question 20 was stated as follows:  
Many stressors affect the quality of life for military service members and 
their families (e.g., high OPTEMPO [operational tempo], frequent moves, 
assignment to jobs or locations that are not desirable, long work hours, 
more lucrative job offers from private industry). If the military retirement 
system is changed to a portable, defined contribution plan, what would 
your response be when these stressors became significant? 
Given the following options—definitely remain in the military, might remain in 
the military, no change in plans, might depart the military, and definitely depart the 
military—39.8% of respondents indicated that they might depart the military if stressors 
became significant, and 36.4 said they would depart the military if stressors became 
significant.   
Regardless of rank (junior enlisted through senior officer) and YOS, there was no 
correlation that the service member might leave with a portable DC plan when stressors 
become significant (see Table 17). Likewise, there was no correlation that the service 
member might leave if pension was based on High-5 versus High-3, if pension was 
delayed until age 65, or if grandfathering was not an option. Hypothetically, if service 
members are offered a portable retirement plan, they will leave at any time. Currently, 
they remain on active duty under stressful environments because they must reach 20 YOS 





























































Intuitively, it would seem that under the current retirement plan, respondents 
would be more likely to serve until retirement as their YOS increase. However, because 
such a question was not asked, it was unknown whether the respondents might depart 
because of the portability of a DC plan or simply because stressors increased significantly. 
2. Responses Considering DBB Specific Recommendations 
Questions 15 and 16 solicited feedback based specifically on DBB 
recommendations; each contained three sub questions. Question 15 was stated as follows:  
How would it affect your decision to stay on active duty until retirement (20 or 
more years of active service): 
A. If pension was changed from the average of your highest 36 months (High-3) 
to the average of your highest 60 months (High-5) 
B. If pension payments were delayed until age 65 
C. If grandfathering was not an option and the system was converted to a defined 
contribution plan from a defined benefit plan? Grandfathering would allow 
current service members to remain in the original retirement system (defined 






Question 16 stated the following: 
If the government matching contribution percentage was based on the following 
conditions, how would it affect your decision to stay in the military until 
retirement (20 or more years of active service): 
A. Your specialty (e.g., combat specialties get higher contributions than 
service support specialties) 
B. Your service in a designated combat zone 
C. Your service on an unaccompanied tour 
The answer choices for Questions 15 and 16 were as follows: (1) would definitely 
serve until retirement, (2) more likely to serve until retirement, (3) no change in plans, (4) 
less likely to serve until retirement, and (5) would definitely not serve until retirement. 
The average scores for questions 15A, 15B, and 15 C were 3.15, 3.33, and 3.05, 
respectively, which indicated that respondents were less likely to remain on active duty 
until retirement. Higher scores were expected, but they were negated by a large number 
of respondents answering these questions counter intuitively. For example, 89 
respondents to question 15B indicated that they would definitely continue serving until 
retirement despite pension payments being delayed to age 65. Also, 110 respondents to 
question 15C indicated that they would also definitely continue serving until retirement 
even if grandfathering into the existing plan was not an option. Likewise, for question 
15A, 50 respondents specified that they would definitely continue serving until retirement 
if the average annuity was changed from a High-3 to High-5. The consequences of these 
actions would result in reduced pension payments. Eliminating these responses changed 
the results to 3.45, 4.24, and 4.11, respectively, shifting the category of responses from 
less likely to serve until retirement to would definitely not serve until retirement. 
 When correlating questions 15A, 15B, and 15C, a significant positive relationship 
existed between the variables (see Table 19.   This signified that respondents viewed the 
three scenarios similarly. In other words, any paired combination between changing from 
a High-3 plan to a High-5 plan, delaying pension to age 65, and not having a 




active duty until retirement, with the strongest relationship being no grandfathering 
option and delaying pension until age 65. 
 
Table 19.   Question 15 Correlation 
 High-5 Age 65 
No 
grandfathering 













Responses to questions 16A, 16B, and 16C showed an inclination by respondents 
to more likely stay on active duty until retirement. Question 16 assumed a defined 
contribution plan was in place, whereas Question 15 did not. When correlating questions 
16A, 16B, and 16C, a significant positive relationship existed between the variables. As 
with Question 15, this signified that respondents viewed the three scenarios similarly. In 
other words, any paired combination between specialty, service in a combat zone, and 
service on an unaccompanied tour, indicated that a service member had no change in 
plans with regards to staying on active duty until retirement. Table 19 shows the 
relationships.  
 
Table 20.   Question 16 Correlation 
 Specialty Combat Zone 
Unaccompanied 
Tour 
















3. Combination of Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Retirement 
Plan 
Question 31 stated, “If the government contributed 8% of your base pay into your 
TSP account, what percentage would you be willing to accept for a defined benefit 
portion of your retirement after 20 years of service?  Currently this is 50%.”  Answer 
choices ranged from 0% to 50% in 5% increments.  50.2% of respondents selected 50% 
as the amount that they would be willing to accept for the DB portion of a hybrid 
retirement plan that also included government-matched TSP contributions. In other 
words, over half of the respondents would be unwilling to have their DB pension 
percentage decreased, even with an 8% government-matched TSP contribution. Several 
respondents adamantly favored retaining the current DB system and indicated that if a 
government TSP match were provided, that it should be in addition to the present DB 
50% pension.  
 Overall, the average percentage of respondents who were willing to accept the DB 
portion of a hybrid retirement plan was slightly above 40%. When the respondents were 
categorized as officer or enlisted, officers favored a slightly higher percentage above the 
average, while enlisted respondents were willing to accept a slightly lower percentage 
than the average at 35–40%. Table 20 depicts officer and enlisted preferences. 
 
Table 21.   Officer and Enlisted Preferences Under a Hybrid Plan 
Respondent Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Officer 254 9.4015758 
2.262462 
 





At 0.1038, there was a slight correlation between rank category (junior enlisted 
through senior officer) and the percentage a respondent would be willing to accept for a 
DB portion of their retirement (see Table 21). This means that, as a respondent’s rank 
                                                 
8 The mean was derived by taking the average of all responses. Responses were categorized as follows: 




increased, so did the percentage that they would be willing to accept for a DB portion of 
their retirement, which supports our conclusions described previously. 
 
Table 22.   Correlation of Question 31 
 Rank Category % willing to accept 
Rank Category 1.0000  















Our report answered the following research question: Had the recommendations 
from the Defense Business Board Military Compensation Task Group’s July 2011 report 
been implemented 20 years ago (in 1991), how would a service member’s retirement 
savings change compared to a service member retiring under the High-3 version of the 
current system?  As a basis of comparison, this report used the DoD Office of the 
Actuary’s average age of death to project the NPV of an officer’s and enlisted service 
member’s retirement at 20 YOS, which was $1.1 million and $742,000, respectively. The 
accumulated retirement savings was then tabulated for a military officer and an enlisted 
service member participating in a DC plan that was constrained by assumptions made 
based on the DBB recommendations. Under such a DC plan, using a 90/10 investment 
strategy, the accumulated savings for an officer (High-3) was $447,000, and $245,000 for 
an enlisted service member. These values represented decreases from the NPV under the 
current retirement system; the officer saw a decrease of $653,000, or 59.4%, and an 
enlisted member saw a $497,000, or 67%, decrease. Two other hypothetical models with 
different investment strategies were also included to compare to this report’s 90/10 model. 
Each showed similar differences between a DB and DC plan. 
Our survey, administered to students at the NPS and II MEF, provided insight into 
service members’ attitudes towards the current retirement plan and proposed changes. 
Respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining the current DB retirement 
plan and said that if a transition did occur, that it should be gradual (i.e., current service 
members grandfathered). Another major takeaway was that if a DC retirement plan was 
adopted, service members were likely to depart the military when stressors such as 




B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Our project model assumed service members managed their portfolio on an 
annual basis. The survey results showed that 53% of respondents never made 
modifications to their TSP portfolio and 32% made medications annually. To what extent 
would the results change if the account were managed on a quarterly, monthly, or weekly 
basis?   
Another consideration for further study would be the handling of retirement 
saving accumulations under a DC plan. It would be portable, but would it be more 
lucrative to leave it in a TSP account or transfer it to another brokerage firm with more 
investment options? 
This project only considered the service member’s perspective. It did not consider 
savings to the government or effects of a retirement system change on the military and 
the services as organizations. From the view of a service member serving until retirement, 
a shift to a DC plan would be devastating to their retirement account. However, for a 
service member serving one or two tours, the service member would likely have portable 
retirement funds. At face value, it appears that the DoD would save hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for each service member, but at what cost?  How many service 
members would choose to depart the military prior to the 20 YOS mark because the 20-
year vesting period was no longer relevant?  How much of the military’s institutional 
knowledge and experience would be lost when seasoned service members depart when 
there is no longer an advantage to stay in for 20 years?   
Factors affecting the government’s matching rate were limited in this study. 
Further study could take these factors into consideration to capture the DBB’s proposed 
flexibility for tabulating a percentage match. For example, to show the variance between 
a service member deploying and a contemporary member who did not, a deployed match 
category was defined as “two times” the base match rate. So, a service member with a 
base match rate of 8% would receive a 16% match while deployed. The DBB 
recommends further flexibility for matching rates for force-shaping measures. In 1991, 




hypothetical base match rate from 8% to 10%. On the other hand, from 1992–1996, 










APPENDIX A. DEFENSE BUSINESS BOARD: MODERNIZING THE 
MILITARY COMPENSATION SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Transition from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan 
o Uses the existing Uniformed Military Personnel Thrift Savings Plan.  
o Government provides matching contribution. 
o Payments into the plan would include an option for military member 
contributions, as follows: 
 Government contribution would be funded at a percentage level 
comparable to the highest end of a private sector pension plan; this 
normally ranges from 4% to 12% government contribution risk 
adjusted to recognize combat roles, family separation, and other 
unusual duties, as follows: 
• double contributions for years in combat zones or high-risk 
positions, and 
• greater contributions for hardship tours. 
 Plan would vest after 3 to 5 years.  
 Plan would be payable at age 60 to 65 (or Social Security age). 
 Plan would include partial withdrawal (or loans) to cover 
education, healthcare, or other specified emergencies. 
 Plan would apply to reserves and active-duty personnel. 
o The plan would provide flexibility to assist in force shaping and sizing. 
o Individual accounts would provide for rights for survivorship. 
o Fully disabled participants would qualify for an immediate pension 
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